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Abstract
The contemporary idea that a parliament acts as a mirror of voter’s party
preferences is historically still very young. At the dawn of modern representative
government, parliamentary elections were held within small, territorially confined
communities. Legislators appeared as agents of their local electorates. While local
representation implies a multitude of small districts, the realization of proportional
party representation on the other hand requires a small quantity of large districts.
Given the apparent incompatibility of the two concepts, representative democracies
are faced with the challenge of finding a middle ground between the two antipodes.
Through the interaction of legal coercion and horizontal transfer, eight of the Swiss
cantons moved to a new, so-called biproportional apportionment method, which
reconciles the two antithetical concepts. The new method constitutes a remarkable
innovation both, theoretically and methodically. While several electoral researchers
devoted themselves to studying the methodical side of the new system, the community
has so far failed to engage into a discussion of its contributions on a theoretical level.
The paper aims at closing this gap by putting the biproportional method in a context
of the history of representation theory and by outlining its undervalued innovations
that become particularly effective in a heterogeneous federal state such as Switzerland.
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1. Introduction
In 1968, Giovanni Sartori argued that “citizens in modern democracies are represented by
and through parties” (1968: 471). Today, barely anyone would question the validity of his
statement. It is a commonplace that in the context of Western democracies, the main channel
through which political representation is realized is through parties and their adherents.
There is, however, a second dimension of political representation that has receded into the
background but still effectively shapes electoral processes today: territorial representation.
In most contemporary electoral systems, the electoral region is territorially subdivided into
smaller districts. The idea behind the subdivision is to bring the representatives closer
to the electors (Ramírez et al. 2008). However, dividing the electoral region into smaller
districts has a drawback with major implications. The decentralization of elections creates
electoral barriers for parties what lowers the permeability of the electoral system. Unless
a party reaches a certain minimal share of votes, it will return empty-handed (even if it
was entitled to a seat in globo). This well-studied mechanical effect of electoral systems
is known to suppress small parties and, consequently, their electorates. The smaller the
district magnitudes, the stronger the reductive effect on the party system and the higher
the discrepancies in vote-seat shares (Duverger 1954, Rae 1967, Sartori 1976, Taagepera and
Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1994).
As a result, there is a conflict of goals between ensuring undistorted party representation
on the one hand (by setting low hurdles) and satisfying the desire of local populations for
territorial representation on the other hand (resulting in high hurdles). Different strategies
have evolved to solve this teleological conflict. In some parliamentary elections, as for the
German Bundestag, the New Zealand House of Representatives or in parts of Eastern Eu-
rope, proportional and majority voting elements have been combined to account for both
dimensions (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001, Bochsler 2010). The most recent attempt to
reconcile these antithetical concepts of representation was conducted in Switzerland at the
subnational level. As a world premiere in 2006, the canton of Zurich switched to the so-called
biproportional apportionment method. Since then, seven more cantons followed suit. The
biproportional method has been designed to ensure equitable overall representation along
both dimensions: political and geographical divisions in the population (Pukelsheim 2017).
In contrast to prior attempts to solve the dilemma, the “Swiss way” offers a methodical
solution that requires only minor changes in the electoral system. Although the methodical
side of the novel method has been studied in-depth already, a comprehensive theoretical
framework of this pioneering innovation is missing so far. This neglect makes it difficult,
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if not impossible, to fully understand the merits of the new method and its contribution
to existing concepts of political representation. In this paper, I fill this gap by linking
the technical side of biproportionality to its underlying theoretical concepts. First, I argue
that biproportionality provides a radically new approach to solve a dilemma endogenous
to electoral representation. Secondly, I argue that its potentials unfold particularly in a
heterogeneous polity like Switzerland where the federalist principle of territoriality is a main
pillar of state organization.
The paper is structured as follows: In chapter 2, I take a step back and trace the trajectories
of the two key principles of political representation inherent to biproportionality. Chapter 3
provides a detailed description of the mechanisms of the biproportional method and shows
how it innovates other proportional apportionment formulae. In chapter 4, I discuss the
potentials and limitations before arriving at a conclusion in chapter 5.
2. The simultaneity of two rivalling concepts of political represen-
tation
Contemporary theoretical thinking on political representation is strongly influenced by the
notion that parties act as the main link between the public and the political sphere (Pitkin
1967, Manin 1997, Rehfeld 2005, Dalton et al. 2011, Golosov 2017). The centrality of parties
for the establishment and functioning of democratic institutions has been emphasized by
a variety of political theorists: Max Weber referred to parties as “the children of democ-
racy” (1990: 35), John Aldrich described them as “endemic to democracy” (1995: 3) and
for Richard Katz, party government is “a synonym for representative democracy” (1987:
2). However, the contemporary notion that parties are the main vehicles for formal polit-
ical representation is historically quite young. Before the emergence of political parties in
modern democracies, individual legislators served as linkages between their local communi-
ties and representative institutions. The purpose of the following sections is to give a brief
overview over both dimensions of political representation in electoral systems, starting with
the territorial dimension (2.1), proceeding with the party dimension (2.2) and arriving at
the paradox in the last section (2.3).
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2.1 Constituency representation as the point of departure for representative
government
Before the advent of parties in modern mass democracies, individual legislators located in
small territorial constituencies served as primary linkages between the public and political de-
cision makers (Dalton 1985: 268-271, Pukelsheim 2017). The principle of territoriality, which
found expression in personalized elections within politically insulated single-member con-
stituencies, formed the conceptional origin of modern representative government (Urbinati
and Warren 2008: 389). Democracy was organized and conceived as a local event, and the
voters were represented by an elect from their own “natural community of interest” (Golosov
2017: 119). Grounded in this territorial understanding of political representation, a long-
lasting debate has raged over the question whether representatives should act as delegates or
as trustees (Pitkin 1967, Dalton 1985, Dovi 2009). A controversy sparked by Edmund Burke’s
famous and equally disputed pamphlet Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).
As for both models, constituency representation is realized by an act of authorization by
the constituents at the outset of the election. This authorization enables the representative
to act “[on] behalf of, in the interest of, as the agent of, someone else” (Pitkin 1967: 113).
However, the models place conflicting demands on the legislative behavior of a representative,
resulting in different degrees of autonomy of action.
The delegate model of constituency representation requires legislators to mirror the ex-
pressed policy preferences of their constituents. This leaves delegates no room for autonomy
from their constituents.1 Their authority to act as representatives is limited to making the
re-presented literally present again. Such notions of binding political allegiance found appli-
cation in the Saddle period in parts of France, the United States, and beyond in the form of
instructions, pledges, imperative mandates, and the practice of discretionary revocability of
representatives (recall) (Manin 1997: 163-167).
The trustee model, in contrast, requires representatives to make decisions based on their
own judgment and in accordance with their own views of right action. Within the limits
of authorization, the trustee enjoys full autonomy even if he/she acts against the interests
of the constituents. This does not mean that the representative is not held accountable for
his/her actions. Voters still have the right not to reelect the representative. Apart from
that, they should not be able to exert any influence on the trustee (Dovi 2009: 4-6). In
Hanna Pitkin’s account (1967), these two models of constituency representation should not
be conceived as mutually exclusive. Instead, she suggests accepting the paradoxical nature
1However, it remains rather ambiguous how this congruence in policy preferences is to be achieved, given
the diversity and potential incompatibility of different policy preferences held by the constituents.
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of political representation and striving to safeguard both, the autonomy of the representative
and the autonomy of the represented.
Regardless of which model for describing citizen-elite relations seems empirically more accu-
rate or appears favorable from a normative stance, they both point to the territorial patterns
of early representative democracy. Electoral processes took place within territorially confined
spaces and individual legislators established a corridor of formal representation between the
constituents and the representative institutions of the polity.
2.2 The victory parade of political parties
The national and industrial revolution at the end of the nineteenth century triggered a
profound transformation of Western European politics. New political cleavages emerged,
dividing society into different camps (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). At the same time, suffrage
was extended to the working class and other segments of society. This dramatically changed
the composition of electorates (Dalton 1985). The increasing call of these new voter segments
for political recognition led to the introduction of proportional representation, which marked
another cornerstone. All these episodes of modern democracy formation gave rise to the
successful establishment and proliferation of mass parties.
While for a long time, political representation was guaranteed by and through local represen-
tatives, this attachment has lost importance over time and was, to a great extent, substituted
by political parties (Golosov 2017: 119). Parties offer voters manifestos with distinct policy
goals. Voters, in turn, opt for those parties that best fit their own policy preferences. This
illustrates that the logic of electoral choice has shifted away from the direct nomination of a
candidate to a comparative assessment of abstract party manifestos. Voters think of formal
political representation primarily in programmatic terms.2 Moreover, evaluations of fairness
of electoral systems are usually measured by the congruence between voters and parties in
seats, ideology, policy preferences or other indicators (Cincea 2013: 178-179). Hence, par-
ties did not only monopolize political power; they also deeply affected how we think about
politics, political representation, and political equality.
However, the territorial dimension of political representation never entirely disappeared. In
fact, it still effectively shapes electoral processes today. Some countries such as the United
States or the United Kingdom have never switched to proportional representation, but still
adhere to FPTP plurality voting. In their candidate-centered voting systems, the principle
2This becomes increasingly debatable since calls for better minority inclusion grow. Such claims could
encourage voting based on descriptive, non-programmatic criteria.
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of territoriality still prevails. Bicameral parliamentary systems devote a separate chamber
of the national legislature to the territorial dimension of political representation and other
countries such as Germany, New Zealand, Croatia, Albania, or Hungary mixed their electoral
systems by combining proportional with majoritarian or plurality voting elements to account
for both dimensions of representation (Bochsler 2010: 86-131).
2.3 The challenge of simultaneously meeting requirements of “both worlds”
In a less conspicuous way, the principle of territoriality is also still preserved in proportional
electoral systems. As for most contemporary democracies, elections are conducted at district-
level – on the national as well as on the subnational level. There are only few exceptions
where legislative representatives are appointed by single-tier at-large elections and not by
two-tier by-district elections (for a short overview over the two allocation levels see Blais
1991: 254-255). The purpose of electoral districts is not exclusively of organizational nature.
Districts also provide local populations with representation in the larger polity’s legislative
body. At the same time, districts enter into a conflict with the party dimension of political
representation. There is extensive literature showing that electoral districts, in particular
small ones, are an impediment to fair, proportional representation of parties.3 The smaller
a district (i.e., the fewer the number of seats assigned to a district), the smaller the chances
of small parties to pass the electoral hurdle imposed by the district. The cumulative effect
across all districts leads, in extreme cases, to considerable disadvantages for small parties
and their electorates in terms of fair representation. Large, established parties, on the other
hand, are the beneficiaries of such mechanically induced (and psychologically reinforced)
distortions of party competition (Duverger 1954, Rae 1967, Sartori 1976, Taagepera and
Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1994). However, following more radical notions of the concept of
electoral equality (“one man, one vote”), voters are not merely equal, they also have the
right to be represented equally. This means that their votes must be converted into seats
with equal chances of success. A normative requirement that is unattainable with small
districts.
To summarize, in most modern democracies, districts are the main geopolitical units for the
allocation of parliamentary seats. From the perspective of political theory, districts can be
understood as an embodiment of the principle of territoriality, which played a crucial role
3Of course, fair representation does not depend solely on district magnitudes, but also on the distribution
of the votes between the parties and on features of the electoral system such as the apportionment formula,
the size of the legislature and legal thresholds. Nevertheless, district magnitude has been identified to be the
most potent predictor of an electoral system’s capacity to generate proportional results (Rae 1967, Taagepera
and Laakso 1980, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Gallagher 1991, Carey and Hix 2011).
5
Proportionality in Two Dimensions Sandro Lüscher
in the genesis of modern democracy. However, districts have proven to be an obstacle to
the approximation of “perfect” party representation, so that in extreme cases a substantial
proportion of the electorate is left unrepresented. There are three solutions to solve the
theoretical puzzle, differing greatly in their radicality: (1) Abolish electoral districts and
introduce a single constituency.4 (2) Mix the electoral system to allow for both dimensions
of political representation to come into effect. (3) Introduce an apportionment method that
is designed to satisfy both dimensions. In the remainder of this paper, I will focus on
the third solution, which offers a radically new approach to reconcile the two antithetical
concepts of representation. The following chapter is devoted to the description of the novel
apportionment method in the Swiss context.
3. The innovation of biproportional apportionment
Biproportional apportionment is an attempt to conceptionally bridge the territorial and
the party dimensions of political representation. It can be understood as an extension of
one-dimensional PR electoral systems which, under certain circumstances, produce results
that conflict with present notions of electoral equality. The subsequent sections show in
outline the context of implementation in Switzerland (3.1), the technicalities of the new
method (3.2) and how it extends one-dimensional proportional apportionment methodically
and conceptionally (3.3).
3.1 The context of implementation in Switzerland
In the course of a public appeal in matters of political rights, the Federal Court as the
highest legal authority in Switzerland declared the election of the Council of the City of
Zurich in 2002 as “unconstitutional”. The court criticized the extreme differences in seats
assigned to the districts. While the smallest district received two seats, the largest district
polled nineteen seats. Since seats were allocated on district-level, these differences in seats
translated into differences in chances both, for voters and for parties, to get a share of
seats proportional to the share of votes the parties received. The court found that the
current practice discriminates against small parties and their electorates. According to the
court’s reasoning, it is not only unacceptable if a vote has little or no weight, but by the
logical reverse-conclusion also if a vote is over-weighted. To ensure equality in electoral
success among all voters and parties, the court defined a minimal requirement of nine seats
4With the side-effect that territories/local communities are no longer represented as such in the electoral
body via district-level mandates.
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per district. This should ensure minimal distortions in vote-seat proportionality. This left
the canton with three options: (1) Introduce a single constituency by abolishing electoral
districts. (2) Perform a redistricting of the electoral area by merging districts with fewer
than nine seats. Or (3) adjust the electoral system in a way that circumvents the problem
of unevenly weighted votes.5
The canton responded to the appeal and created a new legal basis for fair representation
in all legislatures in the canton. Following the advice of Friedrich Pukelsheim, a German
mathematician and expert in electoral matters, the city decided to switch to a new appor-
tionment method. Pukelsheim presented a solution that complies with the federal directive
while retaining the unaltered continuance of electoral districts (Pukelsheim and Schuhmacher
2004). The refined apportionment method, which ensures equitable overall representation of
parties while taking account of geographical divisions in the population, is referred to as the
biproportional (or syn. double-proportional) divisor method.
The debut of the refined method took place in February 2006 in the elections of the Council
of the City of Zurich and was followed by the elections of the Cantonal Council of Zurich
in the same year. Since its successful application in Zurich, another seven cantons followed
suit: Schaffhausen (2008), Aargau (2009), Nidwalden (2014), Zug (2014), Schwyz (2016),
Valais (2017) and most recently Uri (2020). Although all these cantons have switched to the
biproportional method, there are still variations with regard to the modalities of implemen-
tation. Some cantons simultaneously introduced legal thresholds while others did not and in
some cantons the method was modified to account for local peculiarities.6 Apart from the
Swiss cantons, there is yet no other national or subnational electoral system in which the
biproportional method applies. This renders Switzerland a unique case to study different
aspects of the new method.
3.2 Technicalities
Biproportionality is as an attempt to maximize the overall representation of parties merely
by changing the apportionment formula of an electoral system instead of reforming it entirely.
This is achieved through a complex process of algorithmic optimization. The main idea is
5As a matter of fact, the problem is even more complex. The differences in vote and seat shares depend
not only on district sizes but also on the number of submitted candidate lists and on the distribution of
votes to these lists. A fictious example: In a district with 10 seats, a total of 25 lists are being submitted.
The first 10 each receive 4.5 percent of votes; the remaining 15 lists receive an equal share of 3.67 percent of
votes. In this case, the available seats would go to the first then lists, leaving the other 15 lists which poll
55 percent of votes without weight (example from OSCE 2014: 15).
6A compilation of the institutional characteristics of the cantonal parliaments can be found in the ap-
pendix of this document.
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to split the process of seat allocation in two separate but interconnected parts. In a first
step, the seats are apportioned to the parties proportionally to the votes they received.
The literature refers to this step as the upper-tier apportionment or super-apportionment.
More concretely, the votes for all candidates of a party are totaled over all electoral districts
to yield the party votes. However, as the biproportional method applies to multi-member
districts only, voters have different number of votes to cast, depending on the district size.
This translates into different levels of voting power among voters of different districts. To
account for this imbalance, the different scales need to be standardized (Pukelsheim 2017:
261). By shifting the first level of allocation away from the district-level to the upper-tier
level, disparities between the share of votes and share of seats obtained by a party converge
to minimal values. The upper-tier allocation of seats follows the Sainte-Laguë method.7
In a next step, the overall votes obtained by the parties get sub-apportioned to the districts.
This nontrivial process is the centrepiece of the new method and requires further elaboration.
The lower-tier or sub-apportionment must cumulatively satisfy a number of conditions:
(i) The sum of seats attributed to a party in all districts exhausts its overall
number of seats.
(ii) The sum of seats attributed to all parties in a district meet the district size.
(iii) The sum of seats attributed to all districts exhausts the overall number of
party seats.
(iv) Proportionality is observed among parties within a given district, and among
districts within a given party.
While conditions (i)-(iii) relate to the general set-up of the apportionment, condition (iv)
adds biproportionality as a substantial supplementary criterion to the equation.8 The chal-
lenge of finding a distribution that satisfies proportionality in both dimensions is known as
the biproportional apportionment problem (Ramírez et al. 2008, Maier et al. 2010, Serafini
and Simeone 2012). The problem can be solved manually but instead, running a divisor-
based algorithm is advised.9 The so-called iterative algorithm is designed to find those
list and district divisors that satisfy (or best fit) condition (iv), given conditions (i)-(iii).
7Within the family of list-based PR voting systems, Sainte-Laguë is a divisor/highest averages appor-
tionment method with standard rounding.
8The listing is a synthesis from works of Serafini and Simeone 2012: 248 and Pukelsheim 2017: 263.
9In 2004, Friedrich Pukelsheim and his team developed a publicly accessible Java program
(BAZI) to compute electoral input matrices. In 2016, a team of mathematicians at the Rosenheim
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As mentioned above, the results from this iterative allocation process are designed to find
Pareto-optimal biproportional distributions. However, as Gassner (1991: 341) and other au-
thors pointed out, a perfect solution for fair two-dimensional representation does not exist.
The optimization process involves so many criteria that allocation conflicts cannot always
be prevented. Divisor- or multiplier-based methods cannot guarantee proportionality at
district-level unless there are at most two parties and at most two districts. Indeed, it oc-
curs that the sub-apportionment produces anomalous results in certain districts. Anomalous
in the sense that the ranking of the seat numbers in a district deviates from the ranking of
the vote numbers (Bochsler 2005: 22-23, Maier et al. 2010: 375). Such deviations between
vote and seat shares are called discordant seat allocations or seat reversals and have been
studied in depth in the work of Maier, Zachariassen and Zachariasen (2010).
3.3 Innovations
Biproportionality innovates conventional PR-based electoral systems in several ways. Many
of these innovations address shortcomings of one-dimensional proportional representation.
The most commonly discussed problem is the distortive effect of small districts. A cir-
cumstance resulting in an overrepresentation of big parties at the expense of small ones
(Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Balinski and Young 2001). This effect is reinforced by elec-
tion formulae that award remainder seats to large parties, for example the widely used
D’Hondt formula, and also by constitutionally defined electoral thresholds. Electoral sys-
tems in which such one-sided distortions coincide are suggestive of partiality. This harms
the overall integrity of the system and could discourage voters from engaging in politics.
Biproportional apportionment minimizes systemic biases by shifting the first level of ap-
portionment away from the lower tier to the upper tier. This change is elementary as it
significantly reduces the threshold-effect induced by small districts. Additionally, the bipro-
portional method employs a divisor method (Sainte-Laguë) that operates with standard
rounding of the quotients instead of rounding them down. The combination of these two
modifications guarantees an equitable overall representation of party electorates and, thus,
constitutes a central innovation both, in normative and in methodical terms. Another in-
novation is the sub-apportionment. This subsequent step is the essence of the method as
it conforms to both dimensions of representation: to party and to territorial divides in the
population. In this respect, political systems applying biproportionality are closely related
to mixed-member PR systems, which are also devised to represent a population along two
dimensions but solve the allocation problem differently (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001).
The novel method extends conventional PR systems in one more aspect. As pointed out in
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earlier sections, biproportional designs pursue the goal of ensuring equal representation not
only of local populations but also of party electorates. Parties should thus have the same
prospects of seeing their vote shares represented. Voters in turn should have the same levels
of political effectiveness regardless of their vote choice (rule of equal treatment). The concept
of political equality holds thus a prominent place in the theoretical framework of the new
method.
One can think of electoral equality as a multi-layered concept that follows a hierarchical
ordering. In total there are three gradations: Votes can be (un)equally counted, (un)equally
weighted and (un)equally successful (i.e., same chance of being effective). While all existing
electoral formulae realize equality in the count value of votes as a fundamental normative
prerequisite of representative systems (“one man, one vote”), only PR systems advance to
higher levels of electoral equality. Since the biproportional method is designed precisely to
approximate vote-seat proportionality and thus ensures that only a small fraction of votes
is lost in the allocation process, it is, besides mixed-member and at-large PR systems, the
only apportionment method that ensures equality in electoral success (see Table 1 ).
Table 1: Representation formulae and the different layers of electoral equality.
Equality in. . . . . . count value . . . voting power . . . electoral success
MR/Plurality Yes No No
Single PR Yes Yes No
Double PR Yes Yes Yes
4. Potentials and limitations of the new method
As shown in the previous chapter, two-dimensional proportional representation innovates
one-dimensional representation in several aspects. This chapter provides a condensed
overview of the potentials and limitations of the new method.
As biproportionality conforms to highest standards of electoral equality and maximizes pro-
portionality between parties’ vote and seat shares, the main beneficiaries of such an electoral
reform would be expected to be small parties. Particularly fringe parties with a territorially
dispersed electorate, previously hampered by the mechanical constraints of district bound-
aries, are likely to be on the receiving end of such a reform (Bochsler 2005). In this regard,
the adoption of biproportionality would enhance electoral fairness.
Opening the floodgates to small parties would at the same time increase the fragmentation
of the party system. However, a functionalist understanding suggests that moderately frag-
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mented party systems are preferable to highly fragmented systems (Sartori 1976). Some
scholars see a danger in highly fragmented party systems because they correspond with an
increase of volatility between elections. This allegedly impedes governability and poses a
threat to the stability of the political system as a whole. In the context of cantonal imple-
mentations in Switzerland, most of the reforming cantons simultaneously introduced legal
thresholds, either locally by district or globally across all districts. This should prevent a
“rank growth” of minor parties.
Given that biproportionality preserves electoral districts as main units of seat allocation, it
allows territorial communities to find electoral representation not only through parties and
their candidates but also through districts. Although pressured by the party dimension of
voter representation, territorial aspects play still an important role not only in structural
organization of elections, but also in the formation of political identity of territorial groups
(Bengtsson and Wass 2010, Mueller 2013, Deschouwer et al. 2014, Golosov 2017). In this
respect, electoral districts warrant such identity ties between voters and their political bio-
sphere. Such ties are of particular importance in federalist states where the preservation of
territorial communities and their political autonomy is a raison d’état.
An often-discussed limitation of the new apportionment method is the complexity and opac-
ity of the allocation mechanism (Leuzinger 2018, Arnold 2019). The seat allocation is per-
formed by a computer software on the basis of algorithmic optimization. The number of
criteria that must be fulfilled cumulatively makes it nearly impossible for “average citizens”
to replicate the sub-apportionment of seats to parties within individual districts in compli-
ance with the requirement of vote-seat-monotonicity. This drawback can be compensated by
the publication of the list- and party-divisors by the electoral authorities in the aftermath of
the elections (as it is done in Swiss cantons applying the biproportional method). This allows
citizens to validate the results without the need to perform the calculations themselves.
Another limitation arises from the occurrence of counterintuitive results (Bochsler 2005,
Balinski and Young 2001, Golosov 2017). In a biproportional electoral system consisting of
single-member districts, it might occur that within districts or within a party, the number
of seats attributed to parties are disproportionate to the votes they received (as already
mentioned in section 3.2). This anomaly can come in two ways: (1) Within a district (usually
a small one), party A receives more seats than party B, although party B has obtained more
votes. (2) Within a party list, the sub-list from district X receives more seats than the sub-
list from district Y, although the sub-list from district Y obtained more votes (relatively).
When the strongest party in a district receives less seats than another competing party in
the same district, literature also speaks of strongest party discordant (Maier et al. 2010).
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Such paradoxical results are unpreventable in attempts to optimally solve a two-dimensional
apportionment problem. From the perspective of voters in a single-member district who cast
their ballots for a losing candidate with a majority of votes, such results will be difficult to
understand and to accept and they might raise a doubt about the effectiveness of their vote.
For Sebastian Maier and his co-authors, who have thoroughly investigated such anomalies in
a study, such local and not infrequent deviations from the vote-seat-monotonicity are “(. . . )
the price one has to pay to achieve proportionality over the whole electoral region” (2010:
386).
5. Conclusion
How and to what extent does biproportional apportionment innovate conventional methods
of electoral representation – theoretically as well as methodically? This twofold question was
at the center of this paper and was answered with reference to Switzerland, the first and yet
only country that introduced the new method on the subnational level. It has been shown
that the biproportional apportionment method provides a design that allows the reconcil-
iation of two rivalling concepts of political representation: the originary understanding of
political representation as the representation of territories and the more modern notion of
political representation as the representation of voters along the party dimension.
A central innovation of the new method is given by its two-step mechanism of seat allocation.
While the upper-tier apportionment ensures the fair distribution of seats to parties propor-
tionate to their share of votes, the lower-tier apportionment guarantees a fair distribution
of seats to districts proportionate to population figures. Election results thus comply with
both dimensions of political representation.
With the modified electoral system, small parties and their electorates, previously suppressed
by mechanical hurdles, now stand a better chance of having their vote shares converted into
seat shares. Large, established parties on the other hand that could previously profit from
such imbalances hold the short end of the stick. However, as any electoral formula, the
biproportional method too does not come without any limitations. In contrast to conven-
tional, one-dimensional apportionment methods, the biproportional method in all its details
is rather hard to comprehend for laypersons. Moreover, in certain cases, the biproportional
method produces anomalous, counterintuitive results that can compromise the integrity of
the electoral system. In conclusion, however, biproportional apportionment is a highly po-
tent method when the overarching goal of elections is to produce fair outcomes along two
dimensions. For this unique characteristic, the refined method has long been underestimated.
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7. Appendix
Table 2: Overview of cantonal electoral systems.
Canton Electoral System Apportionment Method Legal Quorum
AI Majoritarian - -
AR Mixed Hagenbach-Bischoff -
AG Proportional Biproportional 5% local / 3% global
BS Mixed Sainte-Laguë -
BL Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff -
BE Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff -
FR Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff -
GE Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff 7% global
GL Proportional Sainte-Laguë -
GR Majoritarian - -
JU Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff -
LU Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff -
NE Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff 3% global
NW Proportional Biproportional -
OW Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff -
SZ Proportional Biproportional 1% global
SH Proportional Biproportional -
SO Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff -
SG Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff -
TI Proportional Hare-Niemeyer -
TG Proportional Hagenbach-Bischoff -
UR Proportional Biproportional -
VD Proportional Hare-Niemeyer 5% local
VS Proportional Biproportional 8% local
ZG Proportional Biproportional 5% local / 3% global
ZH Proportional Biproportional 5% local
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